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I. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND TEXAS REGISTER ACT
As was noted in last year's Survey Article,' the enactment of article
6252-13a, the Administrative Procedure and Texas Register Act, 2 created
uncertainties relating to the litigation of state tax cases. Few of these
uncertainties were resolved during the current survey period.
In Robinson v. Bullock3 the Austin court of civil appeals held that the
district court was without jurisdiction to decide the merits of a taxpayer's
action to enjoin the collection of state and local sales taxes where the
taxpayer failed to pay such taxes under protest pursuant to article 1.051 prior
to filing suit. The taxpayer had been granted an administrative redetermina-
tion hearing before the comptroller. After the comptroller issued an adverse
decision and denied the taxpayer a rehearing, the taxpayer filed suit in
district court, relying upon the Register Act for authority to bring suit. 5 In
ruling that the district court had no jurisdiction to entertain the taxpayer's
request for injunctive relief, the court reasoned that the protest statute
provides a special method enabling taxpayers who questioned the validity of
a tax to bring suit against the state in an effort to recover taxes paid under
protest. Since the protest statute created a right not existing at common law
and prescribed a remedy to enforce that right, the courts could act only in
the manner provided by the statute.6 Concluding that there was no repugnan-
cy between the protest statute and the Register Act, the court rejected the
taxpayer's argument that the general repealer clause in the Register Act 7
repeals the protest statute by implication.8
* B.B.A., J.D., University of Texas at Austin. Attorney at Law, Houston, Texas.
1. Burke, Taxation, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 31 Sw. L.J. 435, 438 (1977).
2. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a (Vernon Supp. 1978) [hereinafter referred to
as the Register Act].
3. 553 S.W.2d 196 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
4. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 1.05 (Vernon 1969).
5. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a, § 19(a), (b) (Vernon Supp. 1978) provides:(a) A person who has exhausted all administrative remedies available within
the agency and who is aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case is entitled
to judicial review under this Act. This section is cumulative of other means of
redress provided by statute.
(b) Proceedings for review are instituted by filing a petition within 30 days
after the decision complained of is final and appealable.
6. 553 S.W.2d at 197.
7. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a, § 22 (Vernon Supp. 1978) provides as
follows:
Chapter 274, Acts of the 57th Legislature, Regular Session, 1961, as amended(Article 6252-13, Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes), and all other laws and parts of
laws in conflict with this Act are repealed. This Act does not repeal any existing
statutory provisions conferring investigatory authority on any agency, including
any provision which grants an agency the power, in connection with investigatory
authority, to take depositions, administer oaths or affirmations, examine witnes-
ses, receive evidence, conduct hearings, or issue subpoenas or summons.
8. 553 S.W.2d at 198.
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
An unexplainable aspect of the decision is that the court relied solely on
the protest statute and totally ignored the Limited Sales, Excise and Use
Tax Act. 9 One provision of that act specifically prohibits the issuance of an
injunction to enjoin the collection of sales and use taxes.' 0 Another provi-
sion states that a taxpayer's filing of a claim for refund with the comptroller
is a condition precedent to the filing of suit for the recovery of sales and use
taxes. I
The Limited Sales, Excise and Use Tax Act is the only state tax statute
which provides a procedure whereby a taxpayer may initiate a refund suit to
recover taxes that were not paid under protest. 2 Thus, unless the provisions
of the Register Act governing judicial review are applicable to refund ac-
tions involving state taxes, there is no procedure whereby a taxpayer may
initiate a refund suit to recover taxes, other than sales and use taxes, which
were not paid under protest. This issue was recently litigated in Contran
Corp. v. Bullock.I3 In Contran the surviving corporation in a merger trans-
action filed suit contending that it was entitled to a refund for the franchise
taxes paid by the dissolved corporation prior to the merger. The suit was
filed pursuant to the Register Act after the corporation's claim for refund
had been denied by the comptroller. The attorney general filed a plea to the
jurisdiction on the ground that the taxes for which the surviving corporation
demanded a refund had not been paid under protest. After a trial on the
merits, the district court ruled that the taxpayer corporation was not entitled
to the relief sought. The court, however, left the issue unresolved by failing
to state whether its decision was based on the jurisdictional question or the
substantive question.
Another unresolved issue is whether the manner of judicial review of state
tax cases is by trial de novo or under the substantial evidence rule.14 In
9. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.10 (Vernon 1969).
10. Id. art. 20.10(F).
I. Id. art. 20.10(G)-(I). Interestingly, Comptroller's Sales Tax Ruling .045(3) provides that
payments made under protest will not be placed in a suspense fund but will be deposited in the
same manner prescribed for other payments on the ground that the protest statute is not
applicable to the Limited Sales, Excise and Use Tax Act.
12. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.10(G)-(I) (Vernon 1969).
13. Civ. No. 243,358 (Dist. Ct. of Travis County, 53d Judicial Dist. of Texas, Oct. 5, 1977).
14. This issue was summarized in the Report of Committee on Administrative Practice, 10
STATE BAR OF TEXAS, NEWSLETTER OF THE SECTION OF TAXATION, No. 1, Oct. 1976, at 12, as
follows:
The point to remember is the Attorney General's office has taken a firm position
that the money must be paid in prior to judicial review and that the only judicial
review authorized is pursuant to Article 1.05 the 'protest statute.' Assuming that
the Attorney General's position is correct, i.e., that the protest statute is the
'method provided by law for review' of tax cases, then it would seem to logically
follow that the protest statute provides for trial de novo-it certainly has been so
applied by the District Courts of Travis County in the past. The administrative
action, to-wit, the Comptroller's Certification of tax due has previously, by
statute, given rise to a prima facie case that the tax is due and the burden is on the
taxpayer to show in what manner the Comptroller has unlawfully demanded the
payment of tax. However, the taxpayer has been able to show this in the past
through the evidence presented at the trial of the case on merits and the previous
administrative action is only part of the relevant evidence considered. On the
other hand, a strong case can be made that Article 1.05 does not specifically refer
to trial de novo. Therefore, the law being silent as to the type of judicial review
authorized, the case will be tried under the substantial evidence rule. Insofar as
the Committee on Administrative Practices is aware, no decision has been reach-
ed as to the position that the Attorney General might take on this issue. However,
[Vol. 32
TAXATION
Computer Language Research v. Bullock 5 the taxpayer instituted suit to
recover sales and use taxes paid under protest. In a preliminary hearing the
taxpayer contended that, although the taxes were paid under protest pur-
suant to article 1.05,16 the case should be tried on the basis of the substantial
evidence rule according to the provisions of the Register Act. The attorney
general took the position that the comptroller was not subject to the Register
Act. The court held that the means of appeal available in the case was trial
de novo. 7
The uncertainties surrounding the applicability of the Register Act to state
taxes would best be resolved by additional legislation. Such legislation
should set forth specifically the jurisdictional basis for seeking judicial
review of a contested state tax case as well as the manner of review.
Legislation is also needed to authorize refund suits by taxpayers who remit
taxes to the comptroller without protest. In the absence of such legislation
years of protracted litigation may be required in order to fully resolve these
issues.
Pending resolution of these issues, caution dictates that taxpayers in-
volved in state tax litigation comply with the requirements of both the
protest statute and the Register Act. Taxpayers filing suit for the recovery of
sales and use taxes should also comply with the requirements of articles
20.10(G)-(I).18 Furthermore, proceedings at the administrative hearings level
should be conducted under the assumption that judicial review will be on the
basis of the substantial evidence rule.
II. FRANCHISE TAXES
The allocation of a corporation's taxable capital to Texas is an issue
frequently litigated.' 9 General Dynamics Corp. v. Bullock20 involved the
question whether the gross receipts from a corporation's operations within a
federal enclave in Texas should be classified as gross receipts from business
done in Texas. Although General Dynamics conducted business at several
locations in Texas, the majority of its operations occurred on a federal
enclave in Tarrant County. The corporation sought to recover the portion of
the state franchise taxes paid with respect to its activities within the enclave.
The Buck Act 2' permits a state to collect an "income tax" on business
activities conducted within federal enclaves. The Act defines the term
the careful attorney, using an abundance of caution, would proceed with the case
at the administrative level on the assumption that it would be reviewed as a case
,other than by trial de novo.'
15. Civ. No. 254,647 (Dist. Ct. of Travis County, 53d Judicial Dist. of Texas, 1977).
16. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 1.05 (Vernon 1969).
17. At the time this article was written, the Computer Language Research case was set for
trial on the merits.
18. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.10(G)-(I) (Vernon 1969). See note I I supra and accom-
panying text.
19. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 12.02(1)(a) (Vernon 1969) provides:
Each corporation liable for payment of a franchise tax shall determine the
portion of its entire taxable capital taxable by the State of Texas by multiplying
same by an allocation percentage which shall be the percentage relationship which
the gross receipts from its business done in Texas bear to the total gross receipts
of the corporation from its entire business.
20. 547 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. 1976), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3436 (Jan. 10, 1978).
21. 4 U.S.C. §§ 105-110 (1970).
1978]
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income tax as "any tax levied on, with respect to, or measured by, net
income, gross income or gross receipts." 22 Relying on its analysis of the
Buck Act in a prior case, 23 the Texas Supreme Court held that the franchise
tax was an income tax and was, therefore, permissible. The court reasoned
that the granting of the privilege to transact business in the state was an
economic benefit resulting in the realization of gross income to the corpora-
tion. The court further reasoned that the franchise tax was a "State tax...
measured by . . .gross receipts" within the meaning of section 110(c) of the
Buck Act. 24 It reached this conclusion on the ground that the corporation's
taxable capital is allocable to Texas based on the percentage relationship
which the corporation's gross receipts from its business done in Texas bear
to the corporation's total gross receipts from its entire business.
25
Justice Reavley's concurring opinion concluded that the franchise tax was
not an income tax within the meaning of the Buck Act.26 Nevertheless,
Justice Reavley believed that, for the purpose of taxing General Dynamics
for the privilege of doing business throughout the state, the comptroller
constitutionally could require the corporation to apportion its corporate
capital according to total statewide sales, including sales within the en-
clave. 27 Chief Justice Greenhill dissented on the ground that the franchise
tax was a tax on capital, which was not included within the broad definition
of income tax in the Buck Act. 28 He reasoned that the fact that the franchise
tax allocation formula contains a gross receipts factor does not change the
tax from a tax on capital into an income tax.
National Bancshares Corp. v. Bullock29 raised the question whether divid-
ends and interest received by bank holding companies from national bank
subsidiaries constituted gross receipts from business done in Texas pursuant
to article 12.02(l)(b). 3° Texas has adopted the "location of payor" rule for
determining whether income from intangible assets such as stock of a
corporation or loans constitute gross receipts from business done in Texas.3
Under the location of payor rule only dividends and interest received from
corporations incorporated in Texas constitute gross receipts from business
done in Texas. Dividends and interest received from corporations incor-
porated outside Texas are excluded from gross receipts from business done
in Texas, even though the corporation may be qualified to do business in
22. Id. at § 110.
23. Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Calvert, 478 S.W.2d 926 (Tex.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 967
(1972).
24. 4 U.S.C. § 110 (1970).
25. 547 S.W.2d at 258-59. The statute supporting this statement is TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN.
art. 12.02(1)(a) (Vernon 1969).
26. 547 S.W.2d at 259.
27. Id. Justice Reavley relied on Werner Mach. Co. v. Director of Taxation, 350 U.S. 492
(1956), and Educational Films Corp. v. Ward, 282 U.S. 379 (1931).
28. 547 S.W.2d at 259. Chief Justice Greenhill read the supreme court's prior decision in
Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Calvert, 478 S.W.2d 926 (Tex.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 967 (1972), as
distinguishing between an "income tax" and a tax on capital, such as the franchise tax, for
purposes of the Buck Act.
29. Civ. No. 223,714 (Dist. Ct. of Travis County, 53d Judicial Dist. of Texas, March 17,
1976). At the time this article was written, this case was on appeal to the Austin court of civil
appeals.
30. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 12.02(1)(b) (Vernon 1969).
31. Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Calvert, 414 S.W.2d 172, 175 (Tex. 1967).
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Texas.32 At one time the comptroller specifically applied the location of
payor rule to bank holding companies and excluded dividends and interest
paid to them by their national bank subsidiaries within the state. 33
In 1969 the federal statute governing state taxation of national banks34 was
amended by Public Law 91-15631 to provide that, for the purpose of any tax
law enacted under the authority of any state, a national bank shall be treated
as a bank organized and existing under the laws of the state or other
jurisdiction within which its principal office is located. The provisions of
Public Law 91-156 took effect on January 1, 1973. In 1971 the Texas
Legislature enacted House Bill 730,36 which provides that the passage of
Public Law 91-156 shall not operate to impose or permit the imposition of
any additional tax or taxes upon the "institutions affected thereby" unless
(1) the tax or taxes were being imposed prior to January 1, 1971, or (2) such
institutions are specifically designated as being subject to such additional
tax or taxes other than the limited sales and use tax by an act of the
legislature passed subsequent to the effective date of Public Law 91-156.
On April 18, 1974, the comptroller published Ruling 80-0.18 ,3 which
recognizes that dividends and interest paid by national bank subsidiaries to
bank holding companies prior to January 1, 1973, are not gross receipts from
business done in Texas. The ruling provides, however, that by virtue of
Public Law 91-156, dividends and interest paid on or after January 1, 1973,
by a national bank whose principal office is located within Texas are includ-
able in gross receipts from business done in Texas pursuant to article
12.02(1)(b). 38
In the National Bancshares case, the Travis County district court entered
a judgment against the taxpayers without opinion, thereby requiring the
bank holding companies to include dividends and interest from national
bank subsidiaries in their post-January 1, 1973, gross receipts from business
done in Texas. In so holding, the court adopted the comptroller's position
that even though the franchise taxes of the bank holding companies were
increased by the comptroller's application of Public Law 91-156, such bank
holding companies nevertheless were not institutions affected thereby with-
in the meaning of House Bill 730.31
32. Id.
33. Comptroller's Business Tax Ruling .013(2)(t). The comptroller's rulings may be found
in the following looseleaf services: TEX. STATE TAX REP. (CCH); STATE & Loc. TAXES (P-H);
[TEXAS] INH. EST. & Gwr TAX REP. (CCH).
34. 12 U.S.C. § 548 (1970).
35. Act of Dec. 24, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-156, 83 Stat. 434 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 548
(1976)). 12 U.S.C. § 548 (1976) provides: "For the purposes of any tax law enacted under
authority of the United States or any State, a national bank shall be treated as a bank organized
and existing under the laws of the State or other jurisdiction within which its principal office is
located."
36. 1971 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 292, art. 7, § I, at 1206 (codified as a footnote in TEX. TAX.-
GEN. ANN. art. 20.02 (Vernon Supp. 1978)).
37. On December 31, 1975, Ruling 80-0.18 was reissued as Comptroller's Business Tax
Ruling .013(2)(t).
38. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 12.02(l)(b) (Vernon 1969).
39. Another aspect of the allocation formula issue was considered in Comptroller's Ad-
ministrative Decision No. 8528 (1977), which held that amounts received by a parent corpora-
tion from its subsidiaries for legal and professional fees, interest on commercial notes, and
insurance expenses paid by the parent on behalf of the subsidiaries constituted gross receipts of
the parent for franchise tax purposes. The parent did not charge its subsidiaries for these
1978]
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In Bullock v. King Resources Co.4° a corporation engaged in the oil and
gas production business utilized the full-cost accounting system for financial
reporting, income tax, and franchise tax purposes.4 In 1970 the corporation
sold certain developed oil and gas properties' located both in and out of
Texas. Based on the full-cost accounting system, these sales produced no
"net gain" to be considered under the allocation formula set forth in article
12.02(l)(d) for purposes of determining the corporation's franchise tax. 42
The comptroller's position was that the net gain referred to in article
12.02(1)(d) must be calculated by using an "expense" accounting system
under which all costs allocated to the sales in question, except those directly
related to the properties, would be disallowed. The expense accounting
method reflected a gain on the sales and resulted in a franchise tax deficien-
cy assessment. Relying on the comptroller's business tax rulings which
provide that a company's franchise tax report "shall reflect and the tax shall
be computed on the corporation's financial condition as shown in its books
and records of account,1 43 the court held that the corporation properly
computed its franchise tax liability based on the full-cost accounting system.
The United States Supreme Court in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v.
Brady" upheld a Mississippi tax on the privilege of engaging or continuing in
business or doing business in the state levied on a foreign corporation whose
activities were a part of interstate commerce. The corporation transported
motor vehicles by motor carrier for General Motors Corporation. The vehi-
cles were assembled outside Mississippi and shipped by rail to Jackson,
Mississippi, where they were loaded onto the corporation's trucks and
transported by the corporation to various Mississippi car dealers. The
corporation based its attack on the Mississippi tax solely on the prior
Supreme Court decisions of Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor45 and
Freeman v. Hewit.6 In these cases the Court held that a tax on the privilege
expenses on a line-for-line basis but estimated the amount and charged each subsidiary a
percentage of its annual business. The actual expenses in each case exceeded the amounts
charged the subsidiary. The decision relied on Comptroller's Business Tax Rule .013(2)(q),
which provides:
Receipts from intercorporate sales and charges for services rendered, between
parent and subsidiary, or between other related corporations, constitute gross
receipts for franchise tax calculations, as a parent and its subsidiaries, or other
affiliated corporations, are separate legal entities. The foregoing applies even
though the sales or services are centralized in one of the corporations and
reimbursement to it is based on the actual cost expended in behalf of the other
corporations.
40. 555 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1977, no writ).
41. Under the full-cost accounting method, non-productive exploration costs and general
and administrative expenses are allocated to the discovered reserves, and are deductible in
addition to the direct costs attributable to the particular property. Id. at 790.
42. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 12.02(l)(d) (Vernon 1969) provides:
For the purpose of this Article, the term 'total gross receipts of the corporation
from its entire business' shall include all of the proceeds of all sales of the
corporation's tangible personal property, all receipts from services, all rentals, all
royalties, and all other business receipts, whether within or outside of Texas.
Provided, however, that, as to the sale of investments and capital assets, the term
'total gross receipts of the corporation from its entire business' shall include only
the net gain from such sales.
43. Comptroller's Business Tax Ruling .001(2)(a).
44. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
45. 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
46. 329 U.S. 249 (1946).
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of engaging in an activity in a state could not be applied to an activity that
was a part of interstate commerce. 47 In upholding the validity of the Missis-
sippi tax, the Court overruled the Spector case and rejected the rule set
forth therein that a state tax on the privilege of doing business is per se
unconstitutional when it is applied to interstate commerce. 48
A recent administrative decision permitted a corporation to exclude from
taxable capital a deferred federal income tax account generated by the
capitalization of exploration and development costs for financial accounting
purposes and the amortization of such costs on a unit of production basis for
federal income tax purposes. 49 Utilization of such a deferred income tax
account for financial accounting purposes accorded with generally accepted
accounting principles. In allowing the account's exclusion from taxable
capital, the hearings examiner reasoned that the deferred federal income tax
account represented timing differences between financial and taxable in-
come which would reverse in a definite amount of time regardless of any
actions taken by the taxpayer. The account therefore was indistinguishable
from accounts held to be excludable from taxable capital in Calvert v.
Houston Lighting & Power Co."° This administrative decision expanded the
excludability of deferred federal income tax accounts from taxable capital
because the comptroller's business tax rulings governing exclusions from
taxable capital provide that only deferred federal income tax accounts based
on liberalized depreciation or accelerated amortization are excludable from
surplus for franchise tax purposes." Another administrative decision held
that the deferred portions of federal income tax investment credits taken by
the corporation with respect to its acquisitions of public utility property
were includable in taxable capital.5 2 Several other administrative decisions
considering the includability of items in taxable capital were issued. 3
A recent amendment to Comptroller's Business Tax Ruling .015(3)(d)
47. In proceedings before the Mississippi state courts, the corporation did not allege that its
activity which Mississippi taxed did not have a sufficient nexus with the state, that the tax
discriminated against interstate commerce, that the tax was unfairly apportioned, or that the tax
was unrelated to services provided by the state. While the corporation argued before the United
States Supreme Court that a tax on "the privilege of doing interstate commerce" creates an
unacceptable risk of discrimination and undue burdens, it did not claim that discrimination or
undue burdens existed in fact. 430 U.S. at 277-78.
48. 430 U.S. at 288-89.
49. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 8070 (1977).
50. 369 S.W.2d 502 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
51. Comptroller's Business Tax Ruling .015(2)(a).
52. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 7727 (1977).
53. See, e.g., Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 7248 (1976) (resolution of a
corporation's board of directors reducing stated capital is not effective for franchise tax
purposes until a statement of such reduction is filed with the secretary of state pursuant to TEX.
Bus. CORP. ACT. ANN. art. 4.12(C)-(D) (Vernon 1956)); Comptroller's Administrative Decision
No. 7899 (1977) (treasury stock cancelled by resolution of the corporation's board of directors
but not cancelled by filing a statement with the secretary of state pursuant to TEX. Bus. CORP.
ACT. ANN. art. 4.1 l(B)-(D) (Vernon 1956), is includable in the corporation's taxable capital);
Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 8327 (1977) (corporate purchase of accounts receiv-
able from dealers at 90% of the receivable's face value and retention of 5% of the purchase
price in a reserve account is in the nature of a reserve for bad debts excludable from taxable
capital); Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 8225 (1977) (taxpayer may not exclude
from surplus a reserve for industrial compensation claims derived by use of actuarial tables,
prevailing state tax tables, and claims in process since the reserves are not actual liabilities and
are not fixed in amount).
1978]
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concerns the method of accounting for a corporation's investment in sub-
sidiaries.54 The ruling now requires all parent or investor corporations to use
the cost method of accounting in calculating and reporting the franchise tax
on its investment in subsidiaries or investees. Previously the ruling provided
that whatever method (cost or equity) a parent or investor corporation used
to record its investment on its books and records of account had to be
followed for franchise tax purposes.55 The amendment is applicable to any
franchise tax report required to be filed after December 13, 1977.
A recent legislative change in the franchise tax statutes clarified the
exemption available for corporations engaged in a business involving solar
energy devices.56 Administrative matters amended included forfeiture of the
right to do business in the state upon failure to file franchise tax reports or
pay franchise taxes or penalties,57 liability of officers and directors for such
a forfeiture, 58 notice required to be given before the forfeiture is effective,59
and franchise tax report content requirements. 6°
III. SALES AND USE TAXES
In Bullock v. Statistical Tabulating Corp.61 the supreme court held that
the keypunching of computer cards constituted a service and was not a sale
of tangible personal property at retail to which a sales tax would apply. The
taxpayer, a data processing concern, translated data supplied by the custom-
er onto keypunch cards and instructed the customer how to program his
54. Comptroller's Business Tax Ruling .015(3)(d). Several suits had been filed contesting
the validity of the ruling as it existed prior to its amendment in 1977. See Burke, Taxation,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 31 Sw. L.J. 435, 441 n.45 (1977), and cases cited therein.
55. The previous ruling was embodied in Comptroller's Business Tax Ruling 80-0.09.
56. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 12.03(i)(r) (Vernon Supp. 1978) was amended to clarify that
the franchise tax exemption applies to corporations engaged in the business of manufacturing,
selling, or installing solar energy devices.
57. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 12.14(2) (Vernon Supp. 1978) now provides that a corpora-
tion automatically shall forfeit its right to do business in Texas if its franchise tax report is not
filed or if the amount of its franchise tax and penalties are not paid in full on or before
September 15 of each year; or, when an initial tax report or payment is required, on or before
ninety days after the time the initial report and payment is required. In such situations, the
forfeiture is consummated by the comptroller without judicial ascertainment.
58. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 12.14(3) (Vernon Supp. 1978) was amended to change the
standard by which officers and directors of a corporation which has forfeited its right to do
business within the State of Texas are to be held liable for franchise taxes and other debts of
such corporation which become due and payable subsequent to the date of forfeiture. Pursuant
to the amended statute, an officer or director is liable for such items unless he can show that the
debt was created (1) over his objection, or (2) without his knowledge, if the exercise of
reasonable diligence to acquaint himself with the affairs of the corporation would not have
revealed the intention to create the debt.
59. TEx. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 12.15 (Vernon Supp. 1978) was amended to provide that the
comptroller shall notify each corporation failing timely to file its franchise tax report or pay its
franchise taxes that its right to do business in the state will be forfeited without judicial
ascertainment unless the overdue franchise tax reports are filed or the overdue franchise taxes
together with penalties are paid. The notice must be mailed during the 45-day period following
the day on which the report or payment was required to be made.
60. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 12.12 (Vernon Supp. 1978) was amended to provide that each
corporation must provide on its franchise tax report (1) the name, title and mailing address of
each director and officer of the corporation; and (2) the name of each corporation in which the
corporation filing the report owns a ten percent or greater interest, the percentage owned by the
corporation, and the name of each corporation which owns a ten percent or greater interest of
the corporation filing the report. The comptroller is to forward this information to the secretary
of state to be available for public inspection.
61. 549 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. 1977).
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computer to read and store the data on the cards, which then became
useless. The taxpayer supplied the cards used in the transaction and paid a
sales tax when it bought the cards from its supplier. Customers were billed
either on an hourly labor rate or on a flat rate per one thousand cards.
Customers were not charged for the cards but for the transfer of the data
onto the cards.
The issue before the court involved a construction of the general defini-
tion of sale contained in article 20.01(K)(1)(a) 62 and of the special definition
of sale in article 20.01(K)(2)(a).6 3 In holding that the transaction constituted a
nontaxable service, the supreme court determined that the true object of the
transaction was not the data processing card as contended by the comptrol-
ler, but the purchase of coded or processed data, an intangible item. Reject-
ing the comptroller's contention that the transaction was a taxable sale
pursuant to the special definition of sale found in article 20.01(K)(2)(a), 64 the
court stated:
[T]he transaction at issue here is not one which the legislature intended
to be taxed under this section. This section was intended to prevent
taxpayers from avoiding sales taxes by structuring a transaction such
that it appears that there was no transfer of title or possession of
tangible personal property. It prevents discrimination between the cus-
tomer who can afford to purchase custom-made articles and that cus-
tomer who 'buys off the rack.' This is not the case here. 65
The court's holding is in accord with prior Texas cases which disapproved
the taxation of service-related activities.66
Bullock v. Lone Star Gas Co. 67 concerned the applicability of the article
20.04(G)(3)(a) 6 exemption to materials incorporated into pipelines. The
article exempts from the use tax the use within Texas of tangible personal
property acquired outside the state and moved into the state for use as a
"licensed and certificated carrier of persons or property." 69 The 1972 dis-
trict court decision in Explorer Pipeline Co. v. Calvert70 held the article
62. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.01(K)(l)(a) (Vernon 1969) provides that: " 'Sale' means
and includes any transfer of title or possession, or segregation in contemplation of transfer of
title or possession, exchange, barter, lease or rental, conditional or otherwise, in any manner or
by any means whatsoever, of tangible personal property for a consideration."
63. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.01(K)(2)(a) (Vernon 1969) defines sale as: "[t]he produc-
ing, fabrication, processing, printing or imprinting of tangible personal property for a con-
sideration for consumers who furnish, either directly or indirectly, the materials used in the
producing, fabricating, processing, printing, or imprinting."
64. Id.
65. 549 S.W.2d at 169.
66. In Williams & Lee Scouting Serv., Inc. v. Calvert, 452 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Austin 1970, writ ref'd), the court held an oil field scouting company's gathering of statistical
data and other information and furnishing of reports to various oil companies constituted the
performance of a nontaxable service. In Calvert v. Julian Gold, Inc., 479 S.W.2d 328 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.), charges for altering women's clothing were held to be
charges for remodeling and thereby excluded from the definitions of "receipts" and "sales
price" set forth at TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.01(D)(2)(g) (Vernon 1969) and TEX. TAX.-GEN.
ANN. art. 20.01(L)(3)(g) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
67. 558 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1977, writ filed).
68. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.04(G)(3)(a) (Vernon 1969).
69. Id.




exempted pipe and other component parts purchased outside the state and
brought into the state for use in pipeline construction. The comptroller did
not appeal the decision and granted use tax refunds to other pipeline carriers
in similar fact situations. 71 The comptroller subsequently changed his policy
by issuing a sales tax ruling which provided that items of tangible personal
property which are to be assembled into carriers are not exempt pursuant to
article 20.04(G)(3)(a) because such items are not licensed and certificated
carriers when they enter the state.
72
In Bullock v. Lone Star Gas Co. 73 the taxpayer, holding a permit from the
Texas Railroad Commission, engaged in the business of gathering, trans-
porting, and selling natural gas. During 1972 the taxpayer decided to
construct an intrastate pipeline in Texas. Portions of the pipe incorporated
into the pipeline were purchased by the taxpayer from the Crispin Corpora-
tion of Houston, Texas, whose major business activity was brokering
foreign steel products. Pursuant to the contract between the taxpayer and
Crispin, Crispin arranged for the pipe to be manufactured to Lone Star's
specifications by mills in France and Italy. Crispin purchased the pipe from
these foreign mills and sold it to Lone Star. The taxpayer employed an
independent inspection firm to inspect and reject pipe during production,
manufacture, and shipment of the pipe to Texas. Crispin was responsible for
transportation of the pipe from Europe to the final transportation point near
Houston, Texas. Under the contract, however, title to the pipe passed to
Lone Star upon railroad loading at the European mills. After the pipe arrived
at the port of Houston, it was first taken to a storage yard and then to the
yard of a firm which coated the pipe for corrosion protection. Thereafter,
the pipe was loaded on the taxpayer's trucks and shipped to west Texas.
In holding that the pipe was exempt from the use tax pursuant to article
20.04(G)(3)(a), the court rejected three arguments advanced by the
comptroller. First, the court held that the pipe was not subject to the sales
tax upon which the use tax exemption would not operate. The court pointed
out that the contract between the taxpayer and Crispin specifically provided
that title to the pipe passed from Crispin as seller to the taxpayer as buyer at
the steel mills in Europe. The court noted that the definition of the term sale
as set forth in article 20.01(K)(1)(a) 74 refers to a transfer of title or possesion,
71. Defendant's Answers and Responses to Plaintiff's Request for Admissions and Written
Interrogatories, Admission No. 19, Bullock v. Lone Star Gas Co., 558 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1977, writ filed).
72. See Comptroller's Sales Tax Ruling .017(l), which provides:
Carrier devices such as ships and aircraft, which are acquired outside this state
and are moved into this state for use as a licensed and certificated carrier of
persons or property, are exempt from the use tax. Such carriers are entitled to this
exemption only if acquired outside Texas. Repair or replacement parts which are
acquired outside this state and actually affixed in this state to a self-propelled
vehicle which is a licensed and certificated carrier of persons or property are
exempt from the use tax. Trailers, barges, and semitrailers are not considered to
be self-propelled vehicles. Taxable items which are to be assembled into carriers
are not exempt under the provisions of Article 20.04(G)(3)(a) as such items are not
licensed and certificated carriers when they enter the state.
73. 558 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1977, writ filed).
74. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.01(K)(l)(a) (Vernon 1969). See note 62 supra.
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or a segregation in contemplation of a transfer of title or possession. The
court concluded that the pipe was "segregated" at the mills where it was
specially manufactured and stenciled to identify it for the taxpayer. 75 Sec-
ond, the court relied on a prior Texas Supreme Court decision holding that
the term permit is synonymous with the term license 76 to reject the comptrol-
ler's contention that the taxpayer's permit from the railroad commission did
not qualify it as a "licensed and certificated carrier." 77 Third, the court
rejected the comptroller's argument that even if the taxpayer was a licensed
and certificated carrier, the pipe was subject to the use tax because it was
stored in Texas after it arrived and before it was used as part of the pipeline.
The court reasoned that since the pipe at all times was intended for use as a
gas pipeline, subjecting the pipe to the use tax during the storage phase
would render the exemption meaningless and would be a misconstruction of
the exemption statute. 78
The decision in Lone Star Gas, if upheld, may resolve a problem in the
application of local sales and use taxes to drop-shipment transactions. The
problem arises when a customer places an order at a retailer's place of
business in a Texas city which has adopted the Local Sales and Use Tax
Act 79 for goods shipped directly to the customer from an out-of-state facility
of a manufacturer unrelated to the retailer. The comptroller's present posi-
tion is that this transaction gives rise to a sale for local sales and use tax
purposes which is deemed to be consummated where the order was placed. 80
This position was weakened substantially by Lone Star Gas. According to
the court, when a customer orders goods through a Texas vendor that are
shipped directly to the customer by an out-of-state manufacturer unrelated
to the Texas vendor, the point of the sale for Texas sales and use tax
purposes is the out-of-state manufacturer's mill at which the goods are
segregated in contemplation of transfer of possession to the customer. Since
the sale occurs outside of Texas, the tax to be imposed in connection with
the transaction is a use tax as opposed to a sales tax. When a transaction is
subject to the local use tax as opposed to the local sales tax, the applicability
of the local use tax depends upon the point at which the purchaser stores,
uses or consumes the goods.81 The point at which the order is taken,
therefore, has no bearing on a determination as to whether local tax is
owing.
75. The court relied in part on prior supreme court holdings that a segregation in contempla-
tion of transfer of title or possession occurs and a sale takes place for purposes of the Limited
Sales, Excise and Use Tax Act when materials are loaded upon a common carrier or other
means of transportation for shipment to the vendee. Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Calvert, 519
S.W.2d 106, 110 (Tex. 1975); Gifford-Hill & Co. v. State, 442 S.W.2d 320, 323 (Tex. 1969). The
court found the rule enunciated in these cases foreclosed the comptroller's argument that the
pipe was subject to the sales tax on the theory that there was a transfer of possession of the pipe
from Crispin to the taxpayer at Houston, Texas. Furthermore, the court noted that while the
pipe was being transported from the European mills to Texas, Crispin was acting as bailee,
holding the pipe for the taxpayer, which was the bailor and owner. 558 S.W.2d at 570.
76. Motd v. Boyd, 116 Tex. 82, 286 S.W.458 (1926).
77. 558 S.W.2d at 571.
78. Id.
79. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1066c (Vernon Supp. 1978).
80. Comptroller's Local Tax Ruling .004(2).
81. Comptroller's Local Tax Ruling .005(1).
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In American Biomedical Corp. v. Bullock82 the court upheld the imposi-
tion of sales and use taxes on the purchase of drugs and chemicals by a
medical laboratory to be used in performing tests on human body fluids and
tissues at the request of licensed physicians. The court held that the pur-
chase of such materials was not within the scope of article 20.04(M), 83 which
exempts from sales and use taxes drugs and medicines prescribed or dis-
pensed for humans or animals by a licensed practitioner of the healing arts.
The applicability of sales and use taxes to the leasing and licensing of
motion picture films to motion picture theaters in Texas from October 4,
1975, to June 10, 1977, was upheld in Bullock v. ABC Interstate Theatres,
Inc.84 Article 20.04(Z), 85 before its amendment on June 10, 1977,86 exempted
from sales and use taxes "the receipts from the leasing or licensing of
motion picture films of any kind to or by motion picture theaters which were
subject to admissions taxes." 8 7 On October 4, 1975, a district court in Travis
County held unconstitutional the admissions tax imposed on motion picture
theaters pursuant to article 21.02(2).88 Thereafter, the comptroller issued a
retroactive ruling which provided that, because motion picture theaters were
no longer subject to admissions taxes, the sales and use tax applied to the
rental, lease, and licensing of motion picture films of any kind to or by
theaters.8 9
The motion picture theaters brought suit, contending that the sales and
use tax was discriminatory and therefore unconstitutional because the tax
on film rentals was imposed on motion picture theaters and not on licensed
television stations. Subsequent to the commencement of the litigation, and
after the cases were submitted and orally argued before the Austin court of
civil appeals, the legislature amended Article 20.04(Z) to accord unqualified
exemption from sales and use taxes to both motion picture theaters and
licensed television stations, effective June 10, 1977. 9o Relying on a prior
decision in which it held that there were significant differences between
television stations and motion picture theaters which provided a reasonable
basis for classification of the two industries in separate categories for tax
purposes, 9' the court held that the application of sales and use taxes to
receipts from leasing and licensing motion picture films to motion picture
theaters in Texas between October 4, 1975, and June 10, 1977, was constitu-
tional. 92 The theaters further contended that since the bill amending article
82. 551 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
83. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.04(M) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
84. 557 S.W.2d 337 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ filed).
85. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.04(Z) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
86. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.04(Z) (Vernon Supp. 1978) was amended, effective June
10, 1977, to provide: "There are exempted from the taxes imposed by this Chapter the receipts
from the leasing or licensing of motion picture films of any kind to or by motion picture theaters
and to or by licensed television stations."
87. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.04(Z) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
88. TEX. TAx.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.01(2) (Vernon Supp. 1978). See Bullock v. Interstate
Theatres, Inc., 557 S.W.2d 337, 340 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ filed).
89. 557 S.W.2d at 340.
90. The amended statute is quoted at note 86 supra.
91. Calvert v. American Int'l Television, Inc., 491 S.W.2d 455 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1973, no writ).
92. 557 S.W.2d at 341.
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20.04(Z) passed both houses of the legislature by an overwhelming majority,
a sales and use tax on film rentals never was intended by the legislature.
Noting that evidence of such a lack of legislative intent did not appear in the
bill, the court rejected this argument. 93
An opinion of the Texas attorney general94 concluded that the exemption
contained in article 20.04(N)(6)95 relating to certain machinery or equipment
exclusively used or employed on farms and ranches in the processing,
packing, or marketing of agricultural products by the original producer did
not extend to machinery and equipment utilized by an agricultural coopera-
tive association to process, pack, or market its members' products. The
attorney general reasoned that such machinery and equipment was neither
"operated by the original producer" nor used "exclusively for. . . his own
products" and thus was not within the scope of the exemption. 96 A series of
amendments to the comptroller's sales tax rulings pertaining to agriculture
97
have resulted from this opinion.
In Lorenzo Textile Mills, Inc. v. Bullock98 the issue before the district
court was the appropriate statute of limitations available to the comptroller
for issuing a notice of deficiency determination in a sales and use tax
assessment. The taxpayer contended that the applicable statute of limita-
tions was article 20.06(D)(1), 99 which provides that "every notice of a
deficiency determination shall be personally served or mailed within four
years after the last day of the calendar month following the quarterly period
for which the amount is proposed to be determined or within four years after
the return is filed, whichever period expires the later." 1" The comptroller
contended that the four-year statute of limitations can be extended pursuant
to article 1.045(A)(3),10 1 which provides for extension "in the case of gross
93. Id. at 340.
94. TEX. ATr'Y GEN. Op. No. H-932 (1977).
95. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.04(N)(6) (Vernon Supp. 1978) exempts from sales and use
taxes the following:
Machinery or equipment exclusively used or employed on farms or ranches in the
production of food for human consumption, production of grass, the building or
maintaining of roads and water facilities, feed for any form of animal life, or other
agricultural products to be sold in the regular course of business, and machinery,
equipment, and gooseneck trailers exclusively used in the processing, packing, or
marketing of agricultural products by the original producer at a location operated
by the original producer exclusively for processing, packing, or marketing his own
products.
96. TEX. Arr'Y GEN. Op. No. H-932, at 3896 (1977).
97. Subsequent to the issuance of TEX. ATrr'Y GEN. Op. No. H-932 (1977), the comptroller
issued emergency amendments to Comptroller's Sales Tax Ruling .016 which excluded from the
definition of "farm and ranch" agricultural cooperatives as organized pursuant to TEX. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 5737-5764 (Vernon Supp. 1978). See 2 Tex. Reg. 690 (1977). The
comptroller subsequently determined that while machinery and equipment utilized by an
agricultural cooperative to process, pack or market its member's products is not within the
scope of the exemption set forth in article 20.04(N)(6), machinery and equipment purchased by
agricultural cooperatives and exclusively used on farms or ranches in the production of food for
human consumption would be within the scope of the exemption. To reflect this determination,
the comptroller issued an additional emergency amendment to Comptroller's Sales Tax Ruling
.016. See 3 Tex. Reg. 78 (1978).
98. Civ. No. 248,945 (Dist. Ct. of Travis County, 126th Judicial Dist. of Texas, June 28,
1977). The case is being appealed to the Austin court of civil appeals.
99. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.06(D)(1) (Vernon 1969).
100. Id.
101. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 1.045(A)(3) (Vernon 1969).
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error in information reported in a return that would increase the amount of
tax payable by twenty-five percent or more." 0 2 The taxpayer countered that
the provisions of article 1.045(A) did not affect the four-year limitations
period imposed by article 20.06(D)(1), asserting that the unextended four-
year limitations period was confirmed by the enactment of article
1.045(B),103 wherein a four-year statute of limitations is provided for sales
and use taxes. Contrary to the taxpayer's view, the district court held that
the applicable limitations period can be extended beyond the four-year
period set forth in article 20.06(D)(1) when there is a gross error in informa-
tion reported by a taxpayer in a return that would increase the amount of
sales and use tax payable by twenty-five percent or more.
- The United States Supreme Court in National Geographic Society v.
California Board of Equalization"o considered what nexus with the taxing
state would be required to subject an out-of-state seller to use tax collection
liability. The Society maintained two offices in California that solicited
advertising for the Society's magazine but performed no activities relating to
the Society's mail order business conducted from the District of Columbia
headquarters. All orders for the Society's sales items were mailed from
California directly to the Society's headquarters. The question was whether
the Society's activities at the California offices provided a sufficient nexus
between. the Society and the state, as required by the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment and the commerce clause, to support the imposi-
tion of a state use tax collection liability upon the Society. The Supreme
Court held that even though the two offices played no part in the Society's
sales activities in the state, the Society's continued presence in California in
offices that solicited advertising for its magazine provided a sufficient nexus
to justify California's imposition upon the Society of the duty to act as
collector of use taxes. 05 The Court noted, however, that its affirmance of
the California Supreme Court does not imply agreement with that court's
"slightest presence" standard of constitutional nexus."
Numerous administrative decisions regarding sales and use taxes were
issued by the comptroller during the survey period. These decisions in-
volved sales for resale, 07 contractors and repairmen,108 the exemption for
102. Id.
103. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 1.045(B) (Vernon 1969).
104. 430 U.S. 551 (1977).
105. Id. at 562.
106. Id. at 556.
107. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 7964 (1977) (lending without charge of
property which was purchased under a resale certificate subjects the purchaser to tax on the
purchase price); Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 8041 (1977) (a donation to a
charitable organization of property purchased for resale constitutes a taxable use of the
property and subjects the purchaser to sales and use tax based on the purchase price);
Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 7808 (1977) (a "tax number" on an invoice does not
constitute a valid resale certificate; in the absence of either a resale certificate or other proof
that the sale was for resale, the sale is subject to sales and use tax); Comptroller's Administra-
tive Decision No. 7886 (1977) (a retailer will be considered to have accepted a resale certificate
in good faith unless the comptroller can show that the retailer had actual knowledge that the
tangible personal property was not purchased for resale); Comptroller's Administrative Deci-
sion No. 8639 (1977) (when the taxpayer purchased pinball vending machines which were
placed at various locations under contract whereby the taxpayer received one-half of the
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materials used in manufacturing,"° the exemption for gas and electricity," 0
the occasional sale exemption,"' and various other matters." 2
machines' revenues, such machines were used for purposes other than demonstration, reten-
tion, or display while being held for resale and were taxable).
108. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 7017 (1977) (a lump-sum contractor cannot
be given a credit for sales and use taxes paid to his vendor on items which were purchased for
use on lump-sum contracts and were lost or stolen prior to their use); Comptroller's Administra-
tive Decision No. 7979 (1977) (a person who builds cabinets, delivers them to his customers at ajob site and puts them in place, but neither affixes them to the realty nor has responsibility for
such affixation, is a seller of tangible personal property rather than a "contractor"); Comptrol-
ler's Administrative Decision No. 7563(1) (1977) (stress relieving of pipe is a repair for sales and
use tax purposes); Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 7380 (1977) (the replacement of
an automobile windshield for a consideration is a sale and installation of tangible personal
property and not a repair for sales and use tax purposes).
109. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 7368 (1976) (lubricants used to maintain
manufacturing machinery and equipment and work gloves used during the manufacturing
process to handle rough materials are supplies used in a manner that is merely incidental to the
manufacturing operation and thus are taxable); Comptroller's Administrative Decision No.
7563(2) (1977) (quality control charts which are used and discarded on a daily basis are exempt
from tax pursuant to TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.04(E)(l)(b) (Vernon 1969)); Comptroller's
Administrative Decision No. 8588 (1977) (hand files used to remove burrs and level the ends of
manufactured products are taxable as hand tools pursuant to TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art.
20.04(E)(1)(b)(iii) (Vernon 1969)); Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 7574 (1977) (ma-
terials used in quality control tests are exempt pursuant to TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.04(E)(Vernon 1969)); Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 8118 (1977) (the propagation and
sale of genetically uniform, disease-free rodents for use in medical research is not a "manufac-
turing, processing, or fabricating operation" within the meaning of TEX. TAx.-GEN. ANN. art.
20.04(E) (Vernon 1969)).
110. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 7378 (1976) (electricity used to cool and
freeze food products to a desired temperature constitutes processing and is exempt from sales
and use tax pursuant to TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.04(R) (Vernon 1969), while electricity
used to maintain food products at a desired temperature after cooling or freezing constitutes a
"commercial use" for sales and use tax purposes and thus is taxable pursuant to article
20.04(R)); Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 7558 (1977) (purchases of gas and electr-
icity by a company engaged in the business of transporting materials extracted from the earth
are taxable when used to operate guardhouses and warehouses which are not used directly in
the transportation process); Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 8134 (1977) (the tax-
payer's purchases of gas and electricity used in the production of chilled water, heated water,
and steam which were piped to customers constituted the processing of tangible personal
property and were exempt pursuant to TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.04(R) (Vernon 1969)).
111. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 7303 (1976) (a retailer regularly engaged in
the business of selling taxable items at retail cannot claim the occasional sale exemption set
forth in TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.01(F)(1) (Vernon 1969) for sales of obsolete items even
though less than three such sales were made from each of the retailer's locations); Comptrol-
ler's Administrative Decision No. 7746 (1977) (the sale of all a company's assets except for its
small inventory of poor quality finished products constitutes a sale of its entire operating assets
under TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.01(F)(2) (Vernon 1969)); Comptroller's Administrative
Decision No. 8716 (1977) (since the taxpayer was engaged in selling auto parts and had a sales
tax permit, he could not qualify for the occasional sale exemption with respect to the sale of a
tractor).
112. Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 7113 (1976) (a Texas purchaser is responsi-
ble for the payment of use tax upon its purchase of a computer from the State of Connecticut on
the ground that states are included within the definition of "person" contained in TEX. TAX.-
GEN. ANN. art. 20.01(A) (Vernon 1969) and, therefore, are retailers for sales and use tax
purposes); Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 7901 (1976) (tangible personal property
which is purchased outside of Texas for assembly in Texas into a licensed and certificated
carrier of persons or property is not exempt pursuant to TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art.
20.04(G)(3)(a) (Vernon 1969) on the ground that such property is not a carrier when it enters the
state); Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 7417 (1976) (a taxpayer is liable for sales and
use taxes on its purchase of gas cylinders which are filled with gas and leased to customers in
connection with the sale of the gas on the ground that the taxpayer makes a taxable use of the
cylinders when it fills them with the gas); Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 7664
(1977) (the wiring of a printing press to the main electrical terminal in the taxpayer's plant
represents the performance of a service and does not constitute the sale of tangible personal
property); Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 7401 (1977) (a purchaser does not have to
purchase a going concern in order to acquire a "business" for purposes of the successor
liability provisions set forth in TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.09(l) (Vernon 1969)); Comptroller's
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Most of the legislative activity in the sales and use tax area concerned
exemption statutes.113 Metropolitan rapid transit authorities were given the
power to impose a one percent sales and use tax,"14 and the comptroller has
promulgated emergency rules concerning the administration of this tax. 1 15 In
addition, the legislature made several minor amendments to the sales and
use tax statutes."
6
Administrative Decision No. 7847 (1977) (a landowner must collect and remit sales and use tax
on the sales price of caliche which is severed and removed by a contractor from the landown-
er's property); Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 7449 (1977) (the taxpayer, which
sold canned drinks through a vending machine and received a subsidy for each drink sold from
the person on whose premises the machine was located, owed sales and use taxes on the
subsidy as part of its receipts from the sale of the drinks); Comptroller's Administrative
Decision No. 6843 (1977) (a transfer of tangible personal property between two commonly-
owned corporations is subject to sales and use taxes on the ground that the corporations
constitute separate legal entities and thus there is a change in ownership of the transferred
tangible personal property); Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 8206 (1977) (sales of
meals by a hospital cafeteria to hospital employees and visitors are subject to sales and use
taxes); Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 7995 (1977) (sales of cement are exempt
from sales and use taxes pursuant to TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.04(D)(1)(g) (Vernon 1969);
Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 8167 (1977) (the making of photocopies for a
consideration constitutes the sale of tangible personal property rather than a service and thus is
subject to sales and use taxes); Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 8443 (1977) (hand
controls installed on automobiles to correct a human defect constitute an orthopedic appliance
pursuant to TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.04(M) (Vernon Supp. 1978) and thus are exempt from
sales and use taxes); Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 8209 (1977) (a retailer's
receipts for sales and use tax purposes do not include amounts represented by coupons or
certificates accepted by the retailer as part of its sales price, where the retailer receives no
reimbursement for the amount of the coupons or certificates); Comptroller's Administrative
Decision No. 8040 (1977) (when the purchase price of tangible personal property is in litigation,
the amount that appears on the face of the contract will constitute the tax base for sales and use
tax purposes until such amount is redetermined judicially); Comptroller's Administrative Deci-
sion No. 8668 (1977) (TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.04(G)(3)(a) (Vernon 1969) only confers an
exemption upon actual carrier devices which meet the requirements of the exemption statute
and does not confer an exemption upon non-carrier devices used by a licensed and certificated
carrier in its business); Comptroller's Administrative Decision No. 8407 (1977) (the licensing of
a barge by the United States Coast Guard for safety and inspection purposes does not make the
barge a licensed and certificated carrier of persons or property pursuant to TEX. TAX.-GEN.
ANN. art. 20.04(G)(3)(a) (Vernon 1969)).
113. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.04(H)(7) (Vernon Supp. 1978) (exempting organizations
qualifying for exemption from federal income tax pursuant to section 501(c)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code, provided that no item purchased shall be used for the personal benefit of any
private stockholder or individual and the items purchased must be related to the purposes of the
organization); id. art. 20.04(M) (exempting receipts related to syringes and hypodermic needles
used for medical purposes); id. art. 20.04(Z) (deleting the requirement that a motion picture
theater must be subject to admissions taxes in order to be exempt from sales and use taxes with
respect to the leasing or licensing of motion picture films); id. art. 20.04(AA) (exempting the
purchase of emergency medical equipment when purchased by a volunteer fire department); id.
art. 20.04(BB)(4) (exempting newspapers, whether or not sold or distributed by individual copy
or subscription); id. art. 20.04(FF) (exempting magazines when sold on a subscription basis for
a semiannual or longer period of time and distributed by second class mail); id. art. 20.04(FF)
(exempting receipts from the sale, lease, rental or use of films, tapes, photographs, transparen-
cies, and graphic art materials to or by a licensed radio or television station subject to regulatory
jurisdiction of the Federal Communications Commission if used or consumed in or during any
phase of broadcasting operation and program services; the exemption does not include ma-
chinery, equipment, replacement parts, and accessories for the machinery, or equipment
having a useful life when new in excess of six months); id. art. 20.04(GG) (exempting receipts
from the sale and the use, storage, and other consumption of taxable items sold or acquired at a
tax-free sale or auction held by religious, educational, charitable, or eleemosynary organiza-
tions exempted pursuant to id. art. 20.04(H)(5); such organizations may hold only one tax-free
sale or auction during each calendar year which may continue for one day only).
114. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1118x, § IIB (Vernon Supp. 1978).
115. See Comptroller's Metropolitan Transit Authority Rulings .001 et seq., 2 Tex. Reg.
4812 (1977).
116. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 20.01(L)(3)(i) (Vernon Supp. 1978) (excluding from the




Bullock v. City National Bank"7 concerned the taxability of a non-insured
wife's ownership interest in an insurance policy on her husband's life where
upon their simultaneous death the life insurance proceeds were paid in to a
trust. In 1971 the husband and wife created trusts funded by insurance
policies on the husband's life. Subsequently, the husband, wife, and their
children died in an airplane crash. The comptroller assessed additional
inheritance taxes against the estate of the wife on the grounds that one-half
of the proceeds of the insurance policies on the life of the husband, which
were payable to the trust, should be included in the wife's estate for
inheritance tax purposes.
Relying on federal court decisions which had considered the issue for
federal estate tax purposes," 8 the court held that the value of the wife's
ownership interest in the community life insurance policies for inheritance
tax purposes was not one-half of the proceeds of the policies, but one-half of
the interpolated terminal reserve value of the policies, which was stipulated
by the parties to be zero. The state contended that application of the Texas
Simultaneous Death Statute" 9 placed one-half of the proceeds of the
policies in the wife's ownership, thereby rendering her estate subject to
additional inheritance taxes. In rejecting this contention the court noted that
the provisions of the statute applied only to proceeds of life insurance
policies which are community property and become payable to the estate of
either the husband or the wife. In this case the statute was inapplicable
because the proceeds were paid to the trust named in the policies rather than
to the estate of either spouse. Furthermore, the court noted that the Texas
Simultaneous Death Statute was, by its express terms, inapplicable to cases
in which provision had been made for living trusts or contracts of insurance
service of meals and food products, including soft drinks and candy, for immediate human
consumption when the service charge is separated from the sales price of the meal or food
product and identified as a gratuity or tip and when the total amount of the service charge is
disbursed by the employer to employees who customarily and regularly provide such service);
id. art. 20.01(Y)(1) (amending the definition of "newspaper" to mean a publication printed on
newsprint whose average sales price per copy over a thirty-day period does not exceed seventy-
five cents and which is printed and distributed periodically at daily, weekly, or other short
intervals for the dissemination of news of a general character and of a general interest); id. art.
20.021(F) (providing that purchases of liquor, wine, beer, or malt liquor by the holder of a retail
license or permit issued under the provisions of the Texas Liquor Control Act from holders of
certain specified manufacturer's, wholesaler's, and distributor's permits shall be presumed to
be a purchase for resale, and no resale certificates covering such sales shall be required); id.
art. 20.021(L)(1) (providing that a retailer is not required to remit sales and use taxes on the
portion of a payment for a sale remaining unpaid if the retailer enters the unpaid portion in his
books as a bad debt and if either during the reporting period or during a subsequent reporting
period the bad debt is claimed as a deduction for federal tax purposes; if payment subsequently
is made, the retailer must report and pay the tax during the reporting period in which the
payment is made); id. art. 20.02 1(L)(2) (providing that a credit shall be allowed or reimburse-
ment made to the retailer for taxes paid on sales subsequently determined to be a bad debt and
charged off as such for federal income tax purposes or on the portion of the purchase price
remaining unpaid at the time of repossession made under the terms of a conditional sales
contract).
117. 550 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ).
118. Wien v. Commissioner, 441 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1971); Chown v. Commissioner, 428 F.2d
1395 (9th Cir. 1970).
119. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 47(b) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
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for disposition of property different from the provisions of the statute. 20
During the survey period, the comptroller substantially revised and reis-
sued all Inheritance Tax Rulings. 2 ' Legislation enacted during the survey
period exempts from inheritance taxes the value of certain annuities or other
payments received by any beneficiary which qualify for exemption from
federal estate taxation.12
2
V. AD VALOREM TAXES
In Tenneco, Inc. v. Polk County 123 the Texas Supreme Court considered
the valuation of interstate natural gas transmission pipelines for ad valorem
tax purposes. The Beaumont court of civil appeals,'24 in reversing the trial
court, ruled that Polk County's method of determining the fair market value
of Tenneco's pipelines within the county was demonstrably wrong. The
decision rested on the ground that the capitalization rate utilized by the
county's expert witnesses in determining value, if applied to the net book
value figure on which the Federal Power Commission ("FPC") calculates
the permitted rate of return of an interstate pipeline, would not allow
Tenneco sufficient earnings to pay all of the annual dividends on its pre-
ferred stock or any dividends on its common stock.
In reversing and remanding the Beaumont court's decision, the Texas
Supreme Court determined that application of the capitalization rate to the
pipelines' net book value incorrectly assumed that net book value equaled
fair market value. Tenneco attempted to justify the use of net book value on
the basis that the FPC, in regulating the rates interstate gas pipeline
operators may charge for their gas, determines allowable net income by
multiplying a rate base by a rate of return figure. Pursuant to FPC regula-
tions, a utility's gas transmission properties are included in the rate base at
their net book value. The interstate gas pipeline's income attributable to its
pipeline properties, therefore, equals the product of its net book value and
the rate of return allowed by the FPC.
The supreme court, however, concluded that the fair market value of the
pipeline properties computed accordifig to the income approach would equal
the net book value of the properties only if the rate of return required by the
average investor would be equal to the rate of return allowed the pipeline
company by the FPC. The court stated that if the average investor was
willing to accept a rate of return lower than the rate of return allowed by the
FPC, then he would be willing to pay more for the pipeline than its net book
value. On the other hand, if the investor required a greater rate of return on
his money than the rate of return allowed by the FPC, then he would offer
less than the net book value for the property. The court held that since there
had been no showing at trial that the capitalization rate was equal to the rate
120. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 47(f) (Vernon 1956).
121. Comptroller's Inheritance Tax Rulings .001 et seq.
122. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 14.015(4) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
123. Polk County v. Tenneco, Inc., 554 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1977).
124. Tenneco, Inc. v. Polk County, 546 S.W.2d 63 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976), rev'd,
554 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1977).
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of return allowed by the FPC, the Beaumont court of civil appeals erred in
equating net book value with fair market value for purposes of finding its
hypothetical income figure. The court further concluded that there was
evidence tending to support the trial court's factual determination of market
value and, thus, the court of civil appeals erred in holding that the opinions
of value of the county's expert were based upon methodologies or figures so
inaccurate as to render those opinions legally insufficient evidence of value.
On remand the Beaumont court affirmed the trial court.'25 The court
placed substantial reliance on the supreme court's holding that there was
evidence tending to support the trial court's factual determination of the
market value of the pipelines. In a concurring opinion Chief Justice Dies
pointed out that while net book value and market value of a pipeline
regulated by the FPC are not the same, a prospective buyer would want to
stay close to the net book value, unless he was willing to accept a lesser rate
of return than the regulatory commission allows. Chief Justice Dies stated
that an assessment by any taxing authority of a natural gas pipeline regulated
by the FPC should take into account that a prospective purchaser is only
interested in buying income and, if that income is wholly regulated by the
FPC, the market value of the pipeline primarily would be determined by the
allowed income.
Several developments during the survey period concerned the assessment
of agricultural lands for ad valorem tax purposes. In City of Mesquite v.
Maloufl26 the court considered the applicability of the agricultural assess-
ment provisions of article VIII, section l-d of the Texas Constitution 27 to a
trust. The trial court had rendered judgment for the taxpayer on the ground
that the declaration of trust did not create an existing trust because it was
not the trustor's intention to vest the beneficiaries with a present beneficial
interest in the land. 28 Thus, the trustor was the owner of the land in his own
right rather than as trustee. The trial court further held that the trustor met
the constitutional requirement that agricultural business must be the land-
owner's primary occupation and source of income, thereby entitling him to
the benefits of the agricultural assessment. 29 Additionally, the trial court
concluded that even if the trust did come into existence, the trustor
nevertheless was entitled in his capacity as trustee to the agricultural assess-
ment.
The Texarkana court of civil appeals reversed, finding that a valid trust
had been created. 30 For purposes of applying the constitutional provisions
125. Tenneco, Inc. v. Polk County, No. 7850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont, Oct. 27, 1977).
126. 553 S.W.2d 639 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
127. TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1-d(a) provides:
All land owned by natural persons which is designated for agricultural use in
accordance with the provisions of this Section shall be assessed for all tax
purposes on the consideration of only those factors relative to such agricultural
use. 'Agricultural use' means the raising of livestock or growing of crops, fruit,
flowers, and other products of the soil under natural conditions as a business
venture for profit, which business is the primary occupation and source of income
of the owner.
128. 553 S.W.2d at 642.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 643.
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governing agricultural assessment to the trust, the court held that when a
valid trust is created, the beneficiaries become the owners of the equitable
or beneficial title to the trust property and are considered the real owners,
while the trustee is only the holder of bare legal title. The court concluded
that since the beneficiaries, rather than the trustee, received the benefit of
the agricultural assessment, it should be the beneficiaries' primary occupa-
tions and sources of income which should determine the applicability of the
agricultural assessment. Since no evidence had been presented to the trial
court concerning the beneficiaries' primary occupations and sources of
income, the court held that the beneficiaries were not entitled to the agricul-
tural assessment. 131
The legislature enacted article 7150k132 in 1977 to provide a broader
procedure for valuing agricultural land than that provided under article VIII,
section 1-d of the Texas Constitution. As originally introduced, the bill
provided that it would become effective only upon adoption of a companion
constitutional amendment. The bill subsequently emerged from a confer-
ence committee without being explicitly dependent on the passage of the
constitutional amendment. Thereafter, the proposed constitutional amend-
ment was defeated and article 7150k was enacted.
The Texas attorney general concluded in an opinion that article 7150k, as
enacted without the companion constitutional amendment, was unconstitu-
tional in that it provided for an appraisal of property for ad valorem taxes on
a basis other than fair market value.'33 Two arguments had been advanced
by the article's supporters in an effort to uphold its constitutionality. First, it
was argued .that a companion constitutional amendment was not necessary
because the income capitalization method of valuation provided by the
article was merely a means of ascertaining market value. Rejecting this
argument, the attorney general concluded that article 7150k indicated on its
face that the appraisal formulas set out in the bill produced something other
than fair market value.134 Second, it was argued that a constitutional amend-
ment was unnecessary since the Texas Constitution gives the legislature
broad authority to permit valuation of property on a basis other than market
value. The attorney general also rejected this argument, relying upon the
decision of the Texas Supreme Court in Lively v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. 135
and other authorities 36 indicating that the Texas Constitution requires ap-
praisal of all properties on the basis of fair market value. 137 In another
131. Id. at 644.
132. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 7150k (Vernon Supp. 1978).
133. TEX. Ar'v GEN. Op. No. H-1098 (1977).
134. Id.
135. 102 Tex. 545, 120 S.W. 852 (1909).
136. Rowland v. City of Tyler, 5 S.W.2d 756,760 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1928, jdgmt adopted);
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Warren Independent School Dist., 453 S.W.2d 190, 197 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Dietrich v. Phipps, 438 S.W.2d 900, 902 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1969, no writ); Harlingen Independent School Dist. v. Dunlap, 146
S.W.2d 235, 237 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1940, writ ref'd).
137. In TEX. Arr'x GEN. Op. No. H-1022 (1977) the attorney general similarly ruled that a
constitutional amendment would be required before the legislature could provide for the




opinion relating to agriculture 38 the attorney general concluded that lives-
tock and poultry are not "farm products" pursuant to article VIII, section
19 of the Texas Constitution' and thus were not exempt from taxation
thereunder.
In Victor Equipment Co. v. Denton Independent School District140 the
court followed a prior opinion of the attorney general 4' and held that the
exemption in article 7150f'42 for goods originating outside of Texas and
detained in Texas for a period not more than nine months for assembly,
storage, manufacturing, processing, or fabricating purposes should be
construed as exempting only consigned goods. The legislature in 1977
amended article 7150f to provide that the exemption applies whether the
goods are consigned to or owned by the taxpayer. The amendment provides
that goods meeting the article's requirements shall be deemed to be located
in the state for only a temporary period and thus do not acquire taxable situs
in the state. Prior to amendment, the statute provided that such goods are
deemed to move in interstate commerce and, therefore, are exempt from
taxation. This change in the basis of the exemption represents an effort to
forestall assertions that the exemption, couched in terms of interstate
commerce, was void. 143
Other decisions relating to ad valorem taxes during the survey period are
of minimal general interest. '" Numerous legislative changes pertaining to ad
138. TEX. ATr'Y GEN. Op. No. H-898 (1976).
139. TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 19 provides: "Farm products in the hands of the producer, and
family supplies for home and farm use, are exempt from all taxation unless otherwise directed
by a two-thirds vote of all the members elected to both houses of the Legislature." In TEX.
ATr'y GEN. Op. No. H-938 (1977) the Texas Attorney General concluded that sugar cane, raw
sugar, molasses and/or bagasse held by a cooperative marketing association are "farm prod-
ucts" in the hands of the producer and are exempt from ad valorem taxation.
140. 548 S.W.2d 464 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
141. TEX. ATT'Y GEN. Op. No. H-479 (1974).
142. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 7150f (Vernon Supp. 1978).
143. In 21 J. HOWELL, TEXAS PRACTICE § 69 (Supp. 1977), the author stated the following
with respect to article 7150f prior to its amendment in 1977:
The act has been codified as Article 7150f and apparently purports to be a
definition of goods moving in interstate commerce. If the definition is not as
broad as the commerce clause and the cases construing the same, then the act is
either void or inapplicable as far as the United States Constitution is concerned. If
the act purports to exempt property that is not exempt under the Texas Constitu-
tion or that the Texas Constitution does not grant the Legislature of Texas the
power to exempt, then it is void under the Texas Constitution. Thus, where it
purports to tax or exempt property that was not already taxed or exempted prior
to its passage, it would seem to be void.
144. Zglinski v. Hackett, 552 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ) (after the
tax rolls have been approved and the plan of taxation put into effect, a taxpayer cannot avail
himself of the remedies of injunction and mandamus but may defeat recovery of taxes only to
the extent they are excessive); Gibson v. Kountze Independent School Dist., 552 S.W.2d 588
(Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, no writ) (taxpayers complaining that the school district had
put into effect a program of reappraisal and revaluation of rural lands without any attempt to
reappraise or revalue other categories of property in the district must show that such tax plan
would result in the taxpayers paying more than their fair share of the taxes, thus discriminating
against them by assessing their property at a greater percentage of the true value than the
percentage assessed for properties in other categories; the school district was not estopped
from offering testimony by the tax assessor that certain rural lands belonging to the plaintiffs
were worth more than the one-hundred percent values assigned by the board of equalization);
Hutt v. City of Rocksprings, 552 S.W.2d 583 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(while it was improper and discriminatory for the city deliberately to omit from assessment
almost all personal property except that which was rendered, the taxpayer was not entitled to
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valorem taxes related to exemptions,'145 tax foreclosure sales,'46 tax incre-
relief because he did not prove that as a consequence of the illegal plan his taxes were excessive
or substantially higher than they would have been had the plan followed proper statutory and
constitutional guidelines); First Nat'l Bank v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 551 S.W.2d 112
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (where city allegedly sold land to
corporation for inadequate consideration, taxpayers did not have standing to maintain an action
on behalf of the city for recovery of damages or for a declaration that the sale was void and for
cancellation of the deed); Howell v. City of Dallas, 549 S.W.2d 36 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (a person who voluntarily pays an illegal ad valorem tax has no claim for
repayment, and in the absence of a specific statute, it is immaterial to the right of repayment
whether such illegal tax was paid under protest); Stratton v. Dell Valle Independent School
Dist., 547 S.W.2d 727 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ) (the assessor's consolidation of
two tracts of land as one tract which neither harms nor misleads the taxpayer is a valid
assessment pursuant to TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 7351 (Vernon 1960)); Webb v. L. B.
Walker and Assocs., 544 S.W.2d 952 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (city tax assessor and collector could not reject renditions because they were sworn to
and filed by an agent of the owner rather than the owner himself); Zavala County v. E.D.K.
Ranches, Inc., 544 S.W.2d 484 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, no writ) (where county
officials represented to property owners that the board of equalization agreed with the rendered
valuations of their properties and would not raise such valuations, and subsequently increased
such valuations without notice to the property owners, a temporary injunction was properly
granted to protect the status quo of the property owners pending trial on the merits; due process
requires that the board of equalization give the taxpayer notice and an opportunity to be heard
before increasing the valuation of his property as shown on the tax rolls whether the valuation
was made by the owner's rendition or the assessor on behalf of the owner); TEX. ATr'Y GEN.
Op. No. H-1085 (1977) (if a clinic foundation which owns property and the physicians' associa-
tion which leases the property from the foundation both operate as purely public charities, the
property owned by the foundation which is so operated would be-exempt from ad valorem
taxes); TEX. ATr'Y GEN. Op. No. H-1059 (1977) (a building owned by a nonprofit corporation
and rented to a county as a courthouse was not exempt from taxation as "public property" but
might be exempt as an historic site); TEX. Arr'Y GEN. Op. No. H-894 (1976) (the grant to the
surviving spouse and children of a deceased disabled veteran of an exemption from property
taxes in an amount equal to that the deceased disabled veteran' was entitled to receive at the
time of his death applies both to survivors of those disabled veterans who died before the
effective date of TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 7150h (Vernon Supp. 1978) and to survivors of
those disabled veterans who died thereafter; article 7150h, §§ 8, 9 require that the amount of the
exemption be determined by the percentage of service-connected disability suffered by the
deceased at the time of death).
145. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 7150f (Vernon Supp. 1978) (goods, wares, ores,
and merchandise originating outside Texas and held within Texas for a period not to exceed
nine months for assembly, storage, manufacturing, processing, or fabricating are exempt from
taxation whether consigned to or owned by the taxpayer); id. art. 7150i (the governing body of
any political subdivision may exempt from taxation part or all of the value of a structure, and
the land necessary for access and use thereof, if the structure is (1) designated as a Recorded
Texas Historical Landmark by the Texas Historical Commission and by the governing body of
the taxing unit or (2) designated as a historically significant site that-is in need of tax relief to
encourage its preservation under an ordinance adopted by the governing body of the taxing
unit; id. art. 7150, § 22a (exempting from taxation property, not to exceed 1,000 acres in any
one county, which is reasonably necessary for and used for the preservation and conservation
of wildlife and is owned by a nonprofit corporation meeting certain requirements set forth in the
statute); id. art. 7150, § 29 (exempting from taxation all real and personal property owned by a
nonprofit corporation and held for the exclusive use and development of biomedical education-
al research).
146. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 7328.2 (Vernon Supp. 1978) (providing (I) that the
notice of a sale of real property at a tax foreclosure sale or a sale of real property purchased at a
tax foreclosure sale by the state or a taxing unit shall specify the hour that the sale will begin
and which of the several entrances is the courthouse door where the sale will be held and (2)
that such sales may be conducted by the sheriff, deputy sheriff, or an authorized agent of the
sheriff and that if an agent is utilized, that the notice of the sale shall contain the name, address,
and telephone number of the agent and that a bidder at the sale must be registered at the time
the sale begins); id. art. 7345b-3 (providing limitations on actions concerning the recovery of
real property sold at a tax sale); id. art. 7345b, § 8 (providing that anyone claiming excess
proceeds from a tax foreclosure sale may file a petition during the three-year period following
the sale of the property during which the excess funds are retained by the clerk of the court); id.
art. 7345b, § 9 (providing that if property is purchased by a taxing unit at a tax foreclosure sale,
the taxing unit must preserve the property by reasonable means until the property is redeemed
or sold, and any rental income derived from the property during the redemption period shall be
used to maintain and improve the property).
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ment financing, 14 7 special valuation procedures,148 and various other mat-
ters. 149
A significant legislative development during the survey period was the
enactment of article 7345f'5° which provides a new procedure for appealing
the decision of a board of equalization. The statute provides that a property
owner is entitled to appeal the decision of a board of equalization to a
district court by filing a petition for review with such court within forty-five
days after the tax roll containing the value involved is approved by the
taxing authority. 15 ' Venue is in the county in which the board of equalization
that made the decision is located, 52 and any party to the proceeding is
entitled to a trial by jury on demand. 53 The issue to be decided on appeal is
whether or not the value of the property in question as ascertained by the
board of equalization is in error. 54 If the court or jury finds that the value is
in error, then the court or jury shall set the value for the property as of
January 1 of the tax year in controversy.' 55 The value affixed by the court or
147. The Texas Tax Increment Act of 1977, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1066d (Vernon
Supp. 1978) authorizes municipalities to create redevelopment districts (as defined in the Act)
and to issue tax increment bonds to finance redevelopment plans with respect to such districts.
The Act takes effect only if and when the constitutional amendment proposed by Senate Joint
Resolution No. 44 is adopted. Such Senate Joint Resolution is to be submitted to the electorate
in November 1978.
148. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 7150n (Vernon Supp. 1978) (providing that land
designated for recreational, park, or open-space purposes for a period of ten or more years by a
restriction instrument filed by the owner of the tract with the county clerk shall be appraised by
the tax assessor on the basis of no factor other than those relative to the value of the land as
restricted); id. art. 7174(d) (providing that an interest in a mineral which may be removed by
surface mining or quarrying from a deposit that is not being produced shall be valued at the
price for which the interest would sell while the mineral is in place and not being produced, such
value to be determined by applying a per acre value to the number of acres covered by the
interest); id. art. 71501 (providing that common areas of a subdivision owned by a nonprofit
association or corporation maintaining nominal ownership to such property which is held for
the use, benefit, and enjoyment of the members of such association or corporation will be
assessed at a nominal value, provided the nonprofit association or corporation meets certain
requirements; in appraising individual properties owned by members of the association or
corporation who are entitled to the use and enjoyment of the facilities owned by the association
or corporation, the enhanced value of the individual properties because of the right to the use
and benefit of a facility shall be a factor taken into consideration by the appraiser); id. art. 7174
(providing that the value of a taxable leasehold estate may not be less than the total annual
rental for the leasehold for the year in which it is valued).
149. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 7173(a) (Vernon Supp. 1978) (describing specifically
the types of uses of airport terminals that are excepted from the operation of art. 7173); id. art.
7150m (defining a "planned unit development" as a real property development project in which
the owners of individual parcels of real property in the development each have a membership in
the association that owns and maintains property in the development for use of its members and
providing that a property tax on such property owned by the association may be assessed
proportionately against each member of the association if the association files with the tax
collector a resolution adopted by the majority vote of all members of the association authoriz-
ing the proportionate assessment); id. art. 7329a (clarifying the procedure for deferring or
abating the collection of delinquent taxes on the homesteads of persons sixty-five years or
older); id. art. 7261a (providing a list of certain taxes and fees with respect to which a tax
collector may, but is not required to, accept a check for payment); id. art. 1066b, § I (providing
that any municipality or district located entirely or partly within the boundaries of another
municipality or district is empowered to authorize the tax assessor, board of equalization, and
tax collector of the municipality or district in which it is located, entirely or partly, to act as its
tax assessor, board of equalization, and tax collector).
150. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 7345f (Vernon Supp. 1978).
151. Id. § I.
152. Id. § 2.
153. Id. § 3.
154. Id. § 4(a).
155. Id. § 4(b).
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jury shall be binding on the taxing authority involved in the litigation for the
tax year in question and for the succeeding year, provided that in the
succeeding tax year the taxing authority may add the value of subsequent
improvements to the property to the value affixed by the court or jury. 15 6
The taxing authority may assert as a defense to an appeal under article
7345f that the taxpayer failed to exercise good faith in setting forth the fair
market value of the property in the rendition. The statute specifically pro-
vides that a taxpayer does not fail to exercise good faith if he makes a good
faith effort to estimate the cash market value of the property and renders the
value determined by multiplying his estimate of cash market value by the
assessment ratio in effect. The statute requires that a taxpayer must file a
sworn affidavit with the board of equalization prior to invoking the provi-
sions of article 7345f, but shall not be required to appear personally or by a
representative before the board of equalization. 5 7 While the rights afforded
taxpayers pursuant to article 7345f are cumulative and do not preempt other
remedies granted by statute or evolving by common law, 158 article 7345f
does not expand upon taxpayers' rights to sue for an injunction or restrain-
ing order as a member of a class. 59 Furthermore, the rights granted pursuant
to article 7345f are specifically prohibited from being the basis of injunctive
or restraining order relief in a class action to enjoin a taxing authority's tax
plan. 160
The enactment of article 7345f is a tremendous stride towards providing
relief to taxpayers whose properties have been assessed by taxing au-
thorities based on excessive values. The statute, however, does not ease the
onerous burden placed on taxpayers seeking to attack plans of taxation
where properties within the taxing jurisdiction are assessed at different
effective assessment ratios, where taxing jurisdictions deliberately omit
certain types of personal property, including intangibles, from the tax base,
or where taxing authorities fail to appraise all properties within the taxing
jurisdiction at fair market value. Additional reform is clearly needed. l61
VI. MOTOR VEHICLE SALES AND USE TAXES
There was also substantial legislative change in the motor vehicle sales
and use tax area. A major problem under prior law concerned the distinction
between "rental or renting" ' 62 and "lease or leasing.' ' 63 The purchaser of a
motor vehicle to be used for lease or leasing was previously required to pay
a motor vehicle sales tax at the time of purchase on the total consideration
156. Id. § 4(c).
157. Id. § 5.
158. Id. § 6,
159. Id. § 7.
160. Id.
161. An excellent critique of the Texas property tax system and the onerous burdens placed
on taxpayers seeking to invalidate illegal assessments is contained in Yudof, The Property Tax
in Texas Under State and Federal Law, 51 TEXAS L. REV. 885 (1973). See also Levatino &
Bickerstaff, The Proposed Constitution for Texas, 29 Sw. L.J. 477, 495-505 (1975); Comment,
Equality in Taxation-Houston's Constitutional Dilemma, 10 Hous. L. REV. 656 (1973).
162. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 6.03(E) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
163. Id. art. 6.03(F). Both terms dealt with giving exclusive use of a motor vehicle to another
for a consideration. If the time period was under thirty-one days the transaction would be
termed renting. If the time period exceeded thirty-one days it would be termed a lease.
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paid for the motor vehicle,164 while a motor vehicle purchased for purposes
of rental or renting was only required to collect a tax on gross rental
receipts. 165 In the event the motor vehicle was used both for rental or renting
and lease or leasing, the owner was required to pay both a motor vehicle
sales tax at the time the motor vehicle was purchased and collect and pay a
gross rental receipts tax on the rental of the motor vehicle for periods less
than thirty-one days. This amounted to double taxation on motor vehicles
used for both rental and leasing.
The new legislation alleviates this problem in several ways. First, the
definition of rental or renting has been amended to define the holding period
as "not to exceed 180 days under any one agreement."' 166 In addition, the
term "rental" also includes "any agreement by an original manufacturer of
motor vehicles to give exclusive use of a motor vehicle to another for
consideration and any agreement to give exclusive use of a motor vehicle to
another for re-rental purposes, regardless of the period of time covered by
the agreement." 167 The definition of lease or leasing has been amended
correspondingly to mean to give exclusive use of a motor vehicle to another
for a period of time exceeding 180 days. 168 This change in definition will
necessarily cause a significantly larger number of motor vehicles to fall
solely within the rental or renting category.
Perhaps most importantly, the amendments add a new article 6.04(6), 169
which provides that when a motor vehicle upon which the motor vehicle
sales and use tax has been paid is used for rental, the owner shall collect the
gross rental receipts tax from the person renting the vehicle, and then
receive a credit equal to the motor vehicle sales or use tax previously paid
with respect to the vehicle. Article 6.04(6) thus effectively eliminates the
double taxation under prior law by entitling the owner of the motor vehicle
to credit the motor vehicle sales or use tax previously paid with respect to
the vehicle against the amount of gross rental receipts tax collected.
Other amendments to the motor vehicle sales and use tax law involve
procedural matters relating to registration and payment of tax on motor
vehicles1 70 and exemptions from the tax.'
7
'
164. Id. art. 6.01(1).
165. Id. arts. 6.01(6), 6.04.
166. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 6.03(E) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
167. Id.
168. Id. art. 6.03(F).
169. Id. art. 6.04(6).
170. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 6.01(I) (Vernon Supp. 1978); id. art. 6.041; id. art. 6.05; id.
art. 6.06(1).
171. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 6.09(3) (Vernon Supp. 1978) (exempting the sale of a motor
vehicle to or use of a motor vehicle by a public agency, provided the vehicle is operated with
exempt license plates); id. art. 6.09(3) (exempting the receipts from the sale or rental and the
use of a motor vehicle that is designed to carry more than six passengers, is sold to or used by a
church or religious society and is used primarily for the purpose of providing transportation to
and from church or religious services or meetings; the exemption does not apply to a vehicle
registered as a passenger vehicle and the primary use of which is for the personal or official
needs or duties of a minister); id. art. 6.09(3) (exempting from taxes receipts from the sale and
use of a motor vehicle that is driven primarily by an orthopedically handicapped person, which
is defined as a person so physically impaired that he is unable to operate a motor vehicle which
has not been specially modified; the exemption extends to privately owned vehicles which
require modification for operation by an orthopedically handicapped person, but does not
extend to any vehicle owned or operated by any corporation, partnership, limited partnership or
association); id. art. 6.09(4) (exempting from the gross rental receipts tax the rental of a motor
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VII. FEDERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS STATE TAX MATTERS
There were several legislative changes and court decisions concerning
various state tax matters during the survey period which are of little general
interest. Included in this category are matters relating to employment tax-
es, 172 cigarette taxes,' 173 motor fuel taxes, 174 the authority of the comptroller
to compromise tax liabilities,' 175 the confidentiality of federal tax information
provided to the comptroller, 7 6 the issuance of warrants by the state, 77 cigar
taxes, 78 mixed beverage gross receipts taxes, 79 gross receipt taxes, 8° and
vehicle to a public agency, provided that the tax which would have been remitted on gross
rental receipts without such exemption shall be deemed to have been remitted for the purpose
of calculating the minimum gross rental receipts due and payable to the comptroller pursuant to
art. 6.01(6)); id. art. 6.09(5) (providing that the tax on gross rental receipts does not apply to the
rental of a motor vehicle for the purpose of re-rental and providing further for the issuance of
an exemption certificate by a person authorized by art. 6.041 to register motor vehicles for
rental).
172. Guinn v. State, 551 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (certain
provisions of Texas Unemployment Compensation Act calling for employer contributions and
imposing penalties on employer for failure to make timely filing of wage reports were held to be
constitutional); Texas Employment Comm'n v. Johnnie Dodd Automotive Enterprises, Inc.,
551 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (the Texas Employment
Commission erred in summarily denying an employer's protest of notice of maximum potential
unemployment compensation tax chargeback without consideration of the merits of such
protest on the incorrect basis that the employer was mailed a copy of the former employee's
claim but did not protest it; constitutional due process requires an administrative agency to
accord a full and fair hearing on all disputed fact issues critical to the rights of the parties on a
question before it).
173. Merchants Fast Motor Lines, Inc. v. Bullock, 548 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ( a common carrier which transported cigarettes from one point to
another within the state, but was not licensed for any purpose under the cigarette tax law, did
not receive cigarettes for purpose of making a "first sale" so as to be liable for taxes under the
cigarette tax law).
174. Nu-Way Oil v. Bullock, 546 S.W.2d 336 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, no writ) (the
comptroller may rely on a prima facie presumption that all sales of motor fuel are taxable, and
the burden rests on taxpayers to establish what became of fuel that was unaccounted for).
175. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 1.032A (Vernon Supp. 1978) provides that the comptroller
may compromise or settle any tax liability, including penalty and interest due the State of
Texas, in an order or decision of the comptroller upon a petition for redetermination if: (1) the
cost of collection exceeds the amount of tax due, provided the total amount of tax due does not
exceed $1,000; or (2) the taxpayer is in liquidation, insolvent, or has ceased to do business and
has no property or insufficient property that may be seized to satisfy the tax liability; or (3)
collection of the entire tax due would make the taxpayer insolvent. Subsequent to an examina-
tion of the taxpayer's records and prior to a redetermination proceeding, the comptroller or his
designee may compromise or settle any tax liability, including penalty and interest, if the cost of
collection exceeds the amount of tax due and the total amount of tax due does not exceed $300.
Such compromise or settlement must be approved by the assistant comptroller for legal
services. Finally, the comptroller or his designee may compromise or settle any penalty or
interest if the taxpayer exercised reasonable diligence to comply with the provisions of Title
122A. Such compromise or settlement similarly must be approved by the assistant comptroller
for legal services.
176. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 1.035 (Vernon Supp. 1978) provides that in the event any
person is required to submit any federal tax return or include federal tax return information
with a state tax return or report, such federal return or return information shall be confidential.
No official, employee, or former official or employee of the comptroller shall disclose any such
federal tax return or return information except for the purposes of a judicial proceeding for the
collection of delinquent taxes in which the state is a party. Any present or former official or
employee of the comptroller who wrongfully discloses such information shall be punished by a
fine not exceeding $1,000 or confinement in a jail not exceeding one year, or both.
177. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4350 (Vernon Supp. 1978) (providing that no warrant
shall be issued to any person indebted or owing delinquent taxes to the state until such debt or
taxes are paid).
178. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 8.02 (Vernon Supp. 1978) (amending cigar and tobacco
products tax rate schedules).
179. TEX. PEN. CODE Aux. LAWS art. 666-11 b (Vernon Supp. 1978) (an original or renewal
permit authorizing the retail sale of alcoholic beverages cannot be issued unless the applicant
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hotel occupancy taxes.' 81
A significant development in the federal estate tax area relating to Texas
law is the decision of the Tax Court in Estate of Castleberry v. Commission-
er. 82 During his marriage, the decedent, a Texas resident, had made gifts to
his wife of his one-half community interest in several municipal bonds. On
the federal estate tax return, the value of these bonds was not included in the
decedent's gross estate. The Internal Revenue Service asserted that the fair
market value of the decedent's one-half interest in these bonds was includ-
able in the decedent's gross estate pursuant to section 2036(a)(1)18 3 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 on the ground that the decedent by operation
of state law held a community property interest in the income from the
bonds, even though he had not explicitly or implicitly retained such an
interest under the transfer instrument. The Tax Court held that one-half of
the decedent's one-half community interest, or one-quarter of the whole
value of the bonds, was includable in the decedent's gross estate pursuant to
section 2036(a)(1). In so holding the court reaffirmed the position it previ-
ously had taken in Esate of Hinds v. Commissioner."8
The decedent's estate advanced three arguments in support of its conten-
tion that section 2036(a)(1) is inapplicable to transfers of a Texas community
property interest by one spouse to another, where the donor-spouse
continues to hold a community property right to the income by operation of
files with his application a certificate issued by the comptroller stating that the applicant holds,
or has applied for and satisfies all the requirements for the issuance of, a sales tax permit, if
required, for the place of business for which the alcoholic beverage permit is sought; a permit
may be suspended or cancelled if it is found, after notice and hearing, that the permitee no
longer holds a sales tax permit, if required, or that the permitee is shown on the records of the
comptroller as being subject to a final determination for state or local sales taxes due and
payable); id. art. 666-20d(f) (providing that certificates of deposit or savings and letters of credit
are acceptable in place of a bond if approved by the administrator); id. art. 667-5G (providing
the same requirements for issuance of an original or renewal retail dealer's or retail dealer's on-
premise license as are provided in article 666-1 b).
180. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8501-1, § 11 (Vernon Supp. 1978) is amended to provide
that any person who conducts a boxing or wrestling match, contest, or exhibition wherein an
admission fee is charged shall furnish to the Texas Department of Labor and Standards within
seventy-two hours, rather than forty-eight hours, after the termination of the event a report
showing the number of tickets sold, prices charged, and the amount of gross receipts obtained
from the event and a tax payment based on three percent of the total gross receipts of the event.
The three percent gross receipts tax, as opposed to the admissions tax imposed by TEX. TAX.-
GEN. ANN. arts. 21.01-.04 (Vernon 1969), applies to admission fees for exhibiting a simultane-
ous telecast of any live, spontaneous or current boxing or wrestling match, contest, or exhibi-
tion on a closed circuit telecast.
181. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1269j-4.1, § 3c(a) (Vernon Supp. 1978) (providing that
revenues derived from the hotel occupancy tax may be used for civic theaters, museums, the
encouragement, promotion, improvement, and application of the arts, and historical preserva-
tion and restoration); id. art. 1269j-4.1, § 3a (increasing the maximum tax to four percent); id.
art. 1269j-4. 1, § 3c(b) (providing for the amount of hotel occupancy taxes which must be
reserved by the city for the purpose of advertising public meeting and convention facilities and
promoting tourism).
182. 68 T.C. 682 (1977).
183. I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1) provides:
(a) GENERAL RULE-The value of the gross estate shall include the value
of all property to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at
any time made a transfer (except in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and
full consideration in money or money's worth), by trust or otherwise, under which
he has retained for his life or for any period not ascertainable without reference to
his death or for any period which does not in fact end before his death-
(I) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the
property . ...
184. I1 T.C. 314 (1948), aff'd on other grounds, 180 F.2d 930 (5th Cir. 1950).
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state law. First, the estate argued that the decedent retained no interest in
the income from the bonds within the meaning of section 2036(a)(1), because
there was no agreement, prearrangement, or understanding, either ex-
pressed or implied, between the donor and donee providing for such reten-
tion. Rejecting this contention, the court concluded that section 2036(a)(1)
applies where the donor holds an income interest in transferred property by
operation of state law as well as where he expressly or impliedly retains the
interest under the transfer instrument.
The estate's second argument was that even if the decedent had "re-
tained" an interest, it was not retained "under" the transfer as required by
section 2036(a)(1). The court similarly rejected this argument, relying
primarily upon a prior decision of the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit. 18
The estate's final argument was that the decedent did not retain the
possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the transferred
property pursuant to Texas law. Relying upon Texas statutes, the estate
argued that pursuant to Texas law the decedent's wife had the sole manage-
ment, control, and disposition of the transferred property, 86 and was free to
deal with the community income from the transferred property without the
participation, interference, or consent of the decedent.' 87 Further, the estate
asserted that under Texas law the community income was not subject to any
debts contracted by the decedent. 88 Disagreeing with the estate's views, the
court held that the decedent's wife's control over the transferred property
and community income was not absolute and adverse to the decedent's
interest and was not equivalent to ownership of the community income.
Relying upon various Texas authorities governing the status of community
income, the court concluded that the decedent's right to such income was
not illusory, but was an enforceable right sufficient to require inclusion of a
portion of the transferred property in his gross estate pursuant to section
2036(a)(1).
Relying upon Estate of Bomash v. Commissioner,89 the Internal Revenue
Service urged the court to reconsider its decision in Estate of Hinds' and
185. Estate of McNichol v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 667, 670 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 829 (1959).
186. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.21 (Vernon 1975).
187. Id. § 5.22.
188. Id. § 5.61.
189. 432 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'g 50 T.C. 667 (1968).
190. In Estate of Hinds v. Commissioner, II T.C. 314 (1948), aff'd on other grounds, 180
F.2d 930 (5th Cir. 1950), the Tax Court held that a transfer of the type involved in the
Castleberry case fell within the scope of the predecessor of section 2036(a)(1) and that one-half
of the value of the decedent's community interest in the transferred property (one-quarter of
the whole) was includable in his gross estate. On appeal, the Internal Revenue Service argued
that the entire value of the decedent's community interest in the transferred property was
includable in his gross estate. The taxpayer did not appeal the Tax Court's decision because she
thought the amount of tax imposed pursuant to the decision was too small to justify further
litigation. Upon appeal by the Internal Revenue Service, however, the taxpayer urged that the
Tax Court decision should be affirmed, not because it was right, but because it gave the Internal
Revenue Service more than it was entitled to and thus the Internal Revenue Service could not
complain of it. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed with the taxpayer and affirmed




hold that the entire value of the decedent's one-half community interest in
the bonds was includable in his gross estate on the ground that prior to the
transfer the decedent had a right to one-half of the income from the bonds,
which at that time were community property, and after the transfer the
decedent still had a right pursuant to Texas law to one-half of the income
from the bonds (which then were the wife's separate property). The estate
countered that at most only one-half of the value of the decedent's one-half
community interest in the bonds (or one-quarter of the total value of the
bonds) should be included in his gross estate, because he retained only a
one-half community interest in the income from the portion of the bonds he
transferred to his wife.
In holding that the decedent's gross estate included only one-half of the
transferred share (one-quarter of the whole), the court reasoned that the
decedent retained a right to only one-half of the income from the interest in
the bonds transferred to his wife. Refusing to follow the position asserted by
the Internal Revenue Service, the court stated that such position ignored
applicable provisions of the Treasury Regulations. 91 Further, the court
pointed out that unlike Estate of Bomash, in the case before it there were no
reciprocal transfers made by the decedent and his wife which would give
rise to the reciprocal trust doctrine.
In a concurring opinion, Judge Tannenwald agreed with the result reached
by the majority on the ground that under the Golsen rule'92 the position of
the Internal Revenue Service had to be rejected on the authority of Estate of
Hinds.19 3 Judge Tannenwald stated, however, that absent Golsen, he would
adopt the reasoning of the decision in Estate of Bornash and sustain the
position taken by the Internal Revenue Service. 94 Judge Fay, concurring
and dissenting, concurred with the majority's conclusion that a portion of
We agree with the taxpayer. Without, therefore, at all approving the decision of
the Tax Court, or deciding the point so much labored here by the commissioner
and taxpayer, but unnecessary to the decision of this case, whether the income
from the property was, within the decision of Commissioner of Internal Revenue
v. Porter, 5 Cir., 148 F.2d 566, community property, we deny the petition for
review. We do this upon the authority of the settled law of Texas, 2 that whether
the income be reguarded as separate property of the wife or as community income
from the wife's separate property, the taxpayer retained neither 'the possession
or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from' the property so as to makeapplicable Sec. 81 l(c)(l)(B), invoked by the commissioner and in part applied by
the Tax Court.
2. Art. 4614, Tex. Rev. Stat. of 1925, Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. art. 4614; Arnold
v. Leonard, 114 Tex. 535, 273 S.W. 799; Hawkins v. Britton State Bank, 122
Tex. 69, 52 S.W.2d 243; In re Gutierrez, D.C., 33 F.2d 987; Whitney Hard-
ware Co. v. McMahan, 111 Tex. 242, 231 S.W. 694.
180 F.2d at 932.
In Rev. Rul. 75-504, 1975-2 C.B. 363, the Internal Revenue Service declined to follow the
above-quoted language from Estate of Hinds and ruled that where a husband gave his wife cash
from his separate property which was placed by the wife in a savings account, one-half of the
fair market value of the savings account on the date of the husband's death was includable in his
gross estate as a transfer with a retained interest pursuant to section 2036(a)(1).
19.1. Treas. Reg. 20.2036-1(a).
192. In Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742 (1970), aff'd on another issue, 445 F.2d 985
(10th Cir. 1971), the court stated where the court of appeals to which appeal of a Tax Court case
lies already has passed upon the issue before the Tax Court, the Tax Court will follow the
decision of that court of appeals.
193. 68 T.C. at 693 (Tannenwald, J., concurring).
194. Id.
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the transferred property was includable in the decedent's gross estate under
section 2036(a)(1), but stated that he would include the entire value of the
transferred share in the decedent's gross estate pursuant to the reasoning in
Estate of Bomash. 95 Judge Featherston, dissenting, viewed the reasoning of
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Estate of Hinds as dictating a
holding that the decedent did not retain her right to the income from the
transferred bonds within the meaning of section 2036(a)(1). 19
The Castleberry decision unquestionably has created significant problems
with respect to estate planning in Texas. Definite guidelines cannot be set
forth until this issue is considered by the appellate courts.
195. Id. (Fay, J., concurring and dissenting).
196. Id. at 694-96 (Featherston, J., dissenting).
